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Abstract
This paper analyzes family-owned banks in Thailand. Using the data before the ￿nancial
crisis, we ￿nd that wealthy families extensively use pyramids to control a business empire
which includes ￿nancial and non-￿nancial ￿rms. We analyze the entire family group struc-
ture and ￿nd that one-third of the banks were placed at the second tier near the apex and
two-third of the banks were located at deeper tiers in the pyramids. The empirical results
show that bottom tier banks have lower performance due to risky loans. This evidence is
consistent with the view that when the controlling family maximizes growth and stability of
the entire group, lower tier ￿rms are assigned to undertake risky investment. This ownership
setting can insulate the entire group from the adverse e⁄ect when the investment does not
pay o⁄ because the family owns relatively low cash ￿ ow stake in lower tier ￿rms.
JEL classi￿cation: G21; G38
Keywords: Family-owned banks; Pyramids, Business groups; Emerging markets1 Introduction
A growing body of research shows that banks in many countries around the world are owned
by families (e.g., Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (forthcoming) and Brown and Dinc (2005)).
Many of these banks are the country￿ s largest banks and owned by wealthy families who own
an extensive business empire. For example, in Asia, Hong Kong￿ s largest locally owned bank,
the Bank of East Asia is owned by David Li family; Thailand￿ s largest bank, the Bangkok
Bank, is owned by the Sophonpanich family. In Europe, Sweden￿ s largest bank, the SEB
bank, is controlled by the Wallenbergs family. In Latin America, the Banco de Chile is
controlled by one of Chile￿ s wealthiest, the Luksi· c family. Despite the voluminous literature
on how non-￿nancial ￿rms controlled by the family are structured, little is known about
why and how families own banks. Our study ￿lls this gap in the literature by investigating
banks as parts of family-owned business groups. More precisely, we investigate how the
pyramidal ownership structure a⁄ects bank lending behavior and pro￿tability.
In the existing literature, there are two main views on why families own ￿rms using the
pyramidal structure. Much of the existing literature supports the ￿rst view which empha-
sizes the con￿ icts of interests between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders
(e.g., Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000)). Pyramids are chosen to
facilitate tunneling ￿self-dealing to concentrate pro￿ts in companies owned directly by the
controlling family. The second less dominant view emphasizes the diversi￿cation and growth
of the entire group. Families can use existing ￿rms to set up a number of new ￿rms, thereby
magnifying the family￿ s actual wealth to control several ￿rms (e.g., Almeida and Wolfen-
zon (2006) and Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005)). Also, a pyramid creates an internal
capital market which helps the family group overcome ￿nancial constraints, and therefore
is able to expand their businesses.
Our hypothesis is in line with the second view. We hypothesize that pyramids can help
insulate the entire family group from negative returns and shocks. When the stability of
the group is the controlling family￿ s main concern, the controlling family chooses investment
strategy based on the location of ￿rms in pyramids. Firms that are located deep in pyramids
1are used to undertake risky investment, while safer investment is carried by the ￿rms near
the apex. If the risky investment does not pay o⁄, it would not strongly a⁄ect the entire
group because the controlling family holds only a small part, corresponding to its small cash
￿ ow rights in lower tier ￿rms.
To perform this analysis, we study Thailand because we can obtain detailed ownership
data of family groups that own both ￿nancial and non-￿nancial ￿rms. Our database allows
us not only to draw a broader picture of the family business group, but also to de￿ne
precisely where banks are located within the group. We focus on the period before the
￿nancial crisis (1992-1996) when the country was in an economic downturn as ￿rms and
banks were facing deteriorating investment opportunities. We study banks because their
investment was concentrated on lending, which enables us to identify the channel through
which poor performance is caused. The pre-crisis period also allows us to investigate the
choices made by the controlling family to locate "good" and "risky" loans.
We begin our analysis by drawing the ownership structure of the entire group. We ￿nd
that pyramids were extensively used to control banks by their ultimate owners. We observe
the maximum of four tiers in the pyramids. The apex of pyramids is often dominated by
holding companies. About one-third of the banks in our sample are placed in the second
tier, and two-third of the banks are in the third tier. Interesting results emerge. We ￿nd
that the ratio of ownership to control rights held by the controlling family in the top and
bottom tier banks are not statistically di⁄erent. The results indicate that the expropriation
problem should be similar in both types of banks, and hence their performance. However,
when we classify the banks based on their locations in the pyramids, we observe that on
average bottom tier banks had about 50% more loan growth than top tier banks. These
loans might be considered as risky investment because bottom tier banks turn out to sig-
ni￿cantly underperform top tier banks: about 21% and 50% in terms of ROA and ROE,
respectively. The empirical results are consistent with our hypothesis that the controlling
family maximizes the entire group￿ s stability and growth.
The results from our study can be extended to other emerging economies. Our ￿ndings
suggest that when analyzing family-owned banks, it is instructive to apply the framework of
2the family ￿rm literature and consider the entire group ￿rms with the same ultimate owner.
Our paper is part of a growing literature that examines the evolution of the ownership of
family ￿rms and the incentives for building pyramids. While we provide a novel approach by
introducing "pyramidal tiers" to disentangle the expropriation and the growth hypotheses,
others suggest that pyramids might exist for other reasons. Roe (2003) argues that family
control pyramids help insulate shareholders from powerful labor unions and other social
interests in developed welfare state economies such as Sweden. Morck (2005) contends that
the pyramidal business groups in the U.S. largely disappeared due to the inter-corporate
dividend taxation reforms in the 1930s. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2006) argue that pyramids
in China are built to signal the government￿ s commitment to relinquish control over the
￿rm to incumbent managers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
sample. Section 3 discusses the ownership structure of family groups. Section 4 presents the
empirical results. In Section 5, we discuss what happened to the banks that were placed in
di⁄erent locations in pyramids after the 1997 ￿nancial crisis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Hypothesis development
Why do families build pyramids? To date, there are two main strands of research. One
strand of research argues that families use pyramids to divert resources between the ￿rms
(Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) and Bebchuk, Kraakman, and
Triantis (2000)). The separation of ownership from control generates such incentives. Firms
in lower tiers of control pyramids, in which the controlling shareholder￿ s cash ￿ ow rights
are small compared to voting rights, are more vulnerable to tunneling￿ the controlling
shareholder is likely to transfer resources aggressively out of lower tier ￿rms and into ￿rms
near the pyramid￿ s apex. A large empirical literature measures the extent of tunneling
within pyramids by using the ratio of the controlling owner￿ s cash ￿ ow rights to control
rights1. They ￿nd low pro￿ts in the group ￿rms when there is a substantial divergence
1See e.g., Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), Mitton (2002), Lins (2003), Lemmon and Lins
(2003), and Joh (2003)).
3between the cash ￿ ow rights and control rights of the controlling family.
While not denying the importance of the tunneling problem, the second strand of re-
search argues that families use pyramids to enlarge their business empires. Almeida and
Wolfenzon (2006) and Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) among others, contend that
pyramids magnify the family￿ s actual wealth into control over a number of ￿rms that are
worth much more. Pyramids can also be used to create an internal market which helps relax
￿nancial constraints by letting group ￿rms pool resources. Pyramids can be advantageous in
particular for ￿rms in emerging economies where external ￿nancing is expensive and limited
due to poorly functioning markets and institutions (Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Khanna
and Rivkin (2001)).
Our hypothesis is motivated by the second view. We hypothesize that a group pyramidal
structure can overcome liquidity shock. More precisely, pyramids can be used to insulate the
entire group from the downside of risky investments. As suggested by Morck and Nakamura
(2004), the controlling family does not only carefully select what stakes each company
should own in other group ￿rms but also which ￿rms to place where in the group. When
the stability of the group is the controlling family￿ s main concern, "core" ￿rms which the
family considers important to the group will be located closer to the apex. Non-core ￿rms,
however, are placed lower in the pyramid. Under this ownership structure, safer investment
is carried by the ￿rms near the apex, and riskier investment is conducted by the ￿rms in
lower tiers. The riskier investments are usually made to leverage the group￿ s performance.
As the controlling shareholder owns relatively smaller cash ￿ ow rights in lower tier ￿rms,
this organizational structure, therefore, can reduce the negative impact on the entire group￿ s
net return when the economic environment is not favorable.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic idea of our hypothesis. Family Z owns a bank and a number
of other ￿rms in the business group. We present two cases of di⁄erent ownership structure.
In case 1, Bank X is located at the second tier indicating a greater concern of the controlling
family for the bank. In case 2, Bank Y is placed at the third tier indicating that Bank Y
is not really a core ￿rm of this family. In both Bank X and Bank Y, however, the ratio of
ownership to control rights in the hands of the controlling family is exactly the same. In
4which case, the expropriation hypothesis suggests that the degree of expropriation by the
controlling family should be the same in both Bank X and Bank Y. Hence Bank X and
Bank Y should have similar performance.
However, our hypothesis has a di⁄erent prediction. A bank which is located in a higher
tier should pursue less risky investment. Since in this study our focus is on banks, we analyze
the lending behavior. Our hypothesis, therefore, suggests that Bank Y is more likely to hold
riskier loans that have a higher chance of default, while Bank X is more likely to hold safer
loans. As in bad states, the return of riskier projects is less than that of safer projects.
The return of Bank Y is, therefore, lower than Bank X in bad states. When the downside
of these risky loans is extremely high, the family group can also decide to sell out poorly
performing banks in lower tiers. In case 1, if the family relinquishes Bank X, the group will
lose control of two companies, B and C. In case 2, however, the controlling family will lose
control of Company C if Bank Y is to be liquidated. So, pyramids make the entire group
less sensitive to negative shocks.
[Figure 1 about here]
3 Data
3.1 Sample
We focus on all commercial banks and ￿nance companies that were listed on the Stock
Exchange of Thailand during 1992-1996. Because our focus is the role of family control,
we exclude state-owned ￿nancial institutions. Due to data availability, we also cannot
include non-listed banks and ￿nance companies. Our ￿nal sample consists of 215 bank-
year observations including 13 commercial banks and 36 ￿nance companies. The number of
banks varies each year due to exit and new entries to the exchange. The sample coverage
accounts for 71.2% of the total assets of the ￿nancial sector. Table 1 describes the sample.
Thereafter, "banks" refer to the banks and ￿nance companies in our sample.
It should be noted that most of the Thai banks were founded by wealthy families. These
family-owned banks had long enjoyed a high degree of protection against competition from
5both local and foreign competitors in two important ways. First, there was a moratorium
on the granting of new licences by the central bank. Second, until the ￿nancial crisis in
1997, foreign shareholding was limited to a level of 25%.
[Table 1 about here]
3.2 Ownership data
To construct the ownership structure of family groups and trace the ultimate ownership,
we use the standard method suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999),
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002). In this study, we use a
10% threshold of control rights to de￿ne the ultimate owner.
We use a number of databases to trace the ultimate ownership. The main source of
the ownership data is the company annual reports (FM 56-1). The annual reports are
reproduced by the Stock Exchange of Thailand in two databases namely the I-SIM CD-
ROM and the SETSMART on-line service. The FM 56-1 ￿le includes shareholders with
shareholdings of at least 0.5% and a list of a¢ liated companies and the shareholdings. We
also use the Business On Line (BOL) database to obtain the ownership information of non-
listed companies. The BOL company is the sole agent that has a license from the Ministry
of Commerce to reproduce the accounting and ownership information of all companies that
were registered at the Ministry of Commerce.
We treat all family members as well as companies ultimately owned by these members
as a single shareholder to account for the fact that it is a common practice in Thailand
that businesses are closely tied by an extensive family. A shareholder, therefore, includes
individuals with the same surname as well as close families that are linked to the family by
marriage. Surnames can be used to trace family relationship as family names in Thailand
are unique and only people belonging to a family may use that family￿ s name.
We use multiple data sources to identify family trees. The FM 56-1 ￿le provides the
information on the relationships between the major shareholders and the board members.
For established families, we were able to trace family relationships using various documents
6that provide a genealogical diagram of the top business group families. Brooker Group
(2001) provides the list of the top 150 families, the a¢ liated companies, and family relation-
ship. Sappaiboon (2000, 2001) provides detailed information on family trees of the top 100
families. For less established families, however, we were not able to trace the relationship
beyond the last name and the family information provided in the company annual report
(FM 56-1). Some of our ￿nancial data, therefore, may under-estimate the real value held
by such families.
3.3 The pyramidal structure
We begin our analysis by drawing the ownership structure to identify which tiers banks
are located in a family business group. We stop drawing pyramidal tiers when all banks
and other listed companies that a family owns are identi￿ed. We present an example of
ownership structure to illustrate our database and variables. Figure 2 shows the ownership
structure of the Ratanarak family group as of 1996. This group is also known as the Ayudhya
group. This group is a good example to illustrate how we allocate the ￿rms in each of the
pyramidal tiers and calculate the cash ￿ ow and voting rights. The Ratanarak forms an
enormous pyramid with both ￿nancial and non-￿nancial companies. The group also owned
seven publicly traded ￿rms. This group is actually one of the most complicated cases in our
sample.
The Ratanarak owns one bank, the Bank of Ayudhya Plc. (BAY) and one ￿nance
company, the Ayudhya Investment and Trust Pcl. (AITCO). As these two banks are in our
sample, our analysis is focused primarily on these two banks. Both BAY and AITCO are
controlled by the Ratanarak family, characteristically, through a pyramid of companies that
have shares with di⁄erential cash ￿ ow and voting rights.
At the apex of the pyramid, the Ratanarak located ￿ve holding companies, the Rata-
narak company, the K group, the CKR company, the Super Assets, and the CKS Holding
at the apex to control other companies in the group. Besides these holding companies, the
Bangkok Broadcasting & TV Co., Ltd. (BBTV) which operates a military TV channel is
also placed at the apex. The Ratanarak directly controls 29.3% of the voting rights of BBTV
7and controls indirectly 26.2% via the CKS Holding. Since the direct shareholdings are more
than indirect shareholdings, we place BBTV at the ￿rst tier. The BBTV in turn owns the
following three holding companies namely the Great Luck Equity (30% of the votes), and
the Great Fortune Equity (100% of the votes), and the BBTV Asset Management (25% of
the votes). So, the Great Fortune Equity and the BBTV Asset Management are placed at
the second tier of the pyramid.
The mechanism the Ratanarak used to control the Bank of Ayudhya (BAY) is indeed
not straightforward. The Ratanarak directly owns only a 0.18% stake in BAY. But, through
a control arrangement held by 13 group companies gives the family controls over 31.6% of
voting rights and 21.40% of cash ￿ ow rights in BAY. Each of these 13 companies actually
owns a small stake which ranges from 0.57% to a maximum of 5%. Since 17.24% of the
voting rights in BAY are owned by the group￿ s ￿rst tier ￿rms, we place BAY at the second
tier.
The Ratanarak also controls another three listed companies in the ￿nancial services
industry that are located in the third tier. We present only the ownership of the Ayudhya
Investment and Trust Pcl. (AITCO) because AITCO is a ￿nance company which is in
our sample. The other two companies, the Ayudhaya Insurance Plc. (AYUD) and the
Ayudhaya Jardine CMG Life Plc. (AYUCO) are insurance companies and are not in our
sample. The Ratanarak controls 59.63% of the voting rights and 35.45% of the cash ￿ ow
rights of AITCO. The direct ownership owned by the Ratanarak family is only 9.21%. The
rest is controlled through a chain of group companies namely BAY (10%), the Super Assets
(3.58%), the Great Luck Equity (8%), the Great Fortune Equity (6.23%), BBTV (7.05%),
the CKS Holding (5.33%), AYUD (4.1%), and AYUCO (6.13%). We locate AITCO at
the third tier in the pyramid because the voting rights are concentrated in the second tier
companies which are BAY (10%), the Great Luck Equity (8%), and the Great Fortune
(6.23%).
In sum, the placement of companies appears to be consistent with the fact that banking
has been the Ratanarak family￿ s primary line of business since the group was established
in the 1960s. Accordingly, BAY has served as a core ￿rm of the group, so the Ratanarak
8has placed it nearer to the apex. The group was diversi￿ed into ￿nancial services and
insurance. Another signi￿cant expansion was the addition of non ￿nancial businesses namely
construction materials. Therefore, the bank is located at a high tier and other ￿rms ￿ll lower
tiers.
[Figure 2 about here]
4 Empirical results
In this section, we investigate how pyramidal ownership structure a⁄ects the bank￿ s lending
behaviors and its pro￿tability. Our hypothesis is that banks that sit near bottom tiers in
the pyramid are more likely to extend risky loans. So, bottom tier banks would have poorer
performance.
Table 2 shows the sample classi￿ed according to which tiers in the pyramid the banks
are located. We observe a total of four tiers in the pyramid. None of the banks are placed
at the ￿rst tier. Banks are concentrated mostly in the second and third tiers. Only 3
banks were placed at the fourth tier. Ideally, we should compare the investment activities
and performance of the banks located in the second, third, and fourth tier. However, this
analysis is not feasible due to the small sample size of the fourth tier banks. Therefore, we
classify the banks into two groups: top tier and bottom tier. A bank is classi￿ed in the top
tier if it is placed at the second tier. If a bank sits at the third or fourth tier, it is classi￿ed
as a bottom tier bank. Table 2 shows that the top tier banks account for 33% and bottom
tier banks account for 67% of the total sample, respectively.
We measure risky loans by loan growth. We consider high loan growth as risky invest-
ment because the banks were operating in the economic downturn during 1992-1996 when
there were few "good" lending opportunities. In addition, the ￿nancial industry became
highly competitive with foreign entries when the market was liberalized during the early
1990s. The o⁄-shore banking market, the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF),
was set up in 1993. To respond to the economic environment, banks should seek new pro￿t
opportunities and reduce corporate and real estate loans. Many banks, however, extended
9aggressively real estate loans (Siamwalla (2004)). We measure loan growth as the percentage
change in total outstanding loan.
To investigate whether or not the lending is excessively risky, we relate loan growth to
performance. Speci￿cally, if the lending was risky, it would result in poor performance. We
measure pro￿tability by the ratio of EBIT to total assets (ROA).
[Table 2 about here]
4.1 Univariate analysis
We begin this analysis by testing the association between pyramidal tiers and loan growth,
and between pyramidal tiers and pro￿tability. We run the univariate tests comparing loan
growth, pro￿tability and other ￿rm characteristics of the top and bottom tier banks. Table
3 presents the results which strongly support our hypothesis. The bottom tier banks have a
higher loan growth and a lower pro￿tability than the top tier banks. The t-statistics of the
test of means (t-test) and the z-statistics of the test of medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
are strongly signi￿cant at the 1% level. More speci￿cally, the average loan growth was 31%
for the bottom tier banks which is signi￿cantly higher than 20.9% for the top tier banks.
On pro￿tability, the average ROA for the bottom tier banks is 1.9% which is signi￿cantly
lower than that of the top tier banks of 2.3%. Similar results are observed for another
performance measure, the ratio of EBIT to equity (ROE).
Regarding other ￿rm characteristics, except that top tier banks are signi￿cantly larger
than lower tier banks, both groups of banks are similar in terms of the ratio of equity capital
to total assets and the ratio of total loan to total assets.
On the ownership structure, in the top tier banks, on average the controlling family
owns 23.3% of the cash ￿ ow rights and 28.9% of the voting rights. In the lower tier banks,
the controlling family owns 20.3% of the cash ￿ ow rights and 27.1% of the voting rights.
The univariate tests show that the ownership by the controlling family is not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent between the top tier banks and bottom tier banks. The results indicate that the
variation of the ownership of banks in our sample is signi￿cantly low. This ￿nding may be
10consistent with our hypothesis that the locations where the banks are placed do matter,
particularly when the sample ￿rms have a similar ownership structure as measured by the
ratio of the cash ￿ ow to voting rights.
[Table 3 about here]
4.2 Multivariate analysis
4.2.1 Model speci￿cation
We employ the regression analysis to investigate whether locations in a pyramid a⁄ect bank￿ s
lending behavior and pro￿tability. To measure pyramidal tiers, we use a dummy variable
"bottom tier" which is set to one if the bank is located at the third and fourth tier, and zero
otherwise. The benchmark banks, therefore, are the top tier banks. To relate pyramidal
tiers to lending and pro￿tability, we employ two regression models. In the ￿rst model, the
dependent variable is loan growth. In the second model, the dependent variable is the return
on assets (ROA).
In the loan growth regression, we control for the e⁄ect of pro￿tability and risk factors. If
pro￿tability increases a bank￿ s cash ￿ ow, it improves the lending capacity. The ratio of the
book value of equity capital to total assets is included as a measure for the bank￿ s speci￿c
risk. The capital ratio may be negative related to loan growth. Low capitalized banks may
take more risk to boost pro￿ts by extending loans more aggressively.
In the pro￿tability equation, we include a loan growth variable to capture risk e⁄ects
of loan portfolio on pro￿tability. Compared to other assets, loans are often regarded as
more risky than other forms of bank assets. We include squared loan growth to account for
any non-linear e⁄ects of loan growth on pro￿tability. Also, we include the capital ratio to
capture bank-speci￿c risk factors. Previous literature suggests both negative and positive
relationships between capital and pro￿ts. On the negative relationship, as noted earlier,
lower capitalized banks may have stronger incentives to take more risk to increase prof-
itability. However, the level of capital can be positively related to the bank￿ s pro￿tability
due to earnings retention.
11In both models, we control for the ownership e⁄ects by including the percentage of
cash ￿ ow rights and the ratio of cash ￿ ow to control rights by the controlling owner. We
also control for the e⁄ect of bank characteristics such as bank size. Bank size is measured
by the logarithm of total assets. Theoretically, the relationship between size and loan
growth is not clear. Size captures loan supply conditions. Larger banks often have more
branches, hence they may be able to acquire more deposits and are able to extend more
loans. However, smaller banks may pursue a more aggressive lending policy to seek new
investment opportunities to replace low return lending.
To control for bank types, we include a dummy variable, ￿nance company, which equals
one for ￿nance companies and, zero otherwise. Year dummies are included to control for
the economic conditions and the e⁄ect of any changes in regulations.
We employ the following two sets of regression techniques. First, we use the pooled
OLS regression analysis in which the standard errors are adjusted by clustering at the bank
level. Second, we employ the random-e⁄ects panel data model to address the potential
biases arising from individual bank heterogeneity. Fixed-e⁄ects regressions are not feasible
in our analysis because there is no within-bank position variation in the pyramids. In other
words, our main explanatory variable, the pyramidal tier, is a time-invariate variable. We
also perform Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier tests to examine whether errors
are independent (OLS vs. Random-e⁄ects).
4.2.2 Pyramidal tiers and loan growth
Table 4 reports the regression results when the dependent variable is loan growth. The
results are consistent with the univariate tests. The estimated coe¢ cients on the bottom
tier dummy variable are positive and strongly signi￿cant at the 1% level in all of the
regressions. The evidence suggests that banks located at the bottom tiers tend to pursue
more aggressive lending policy than the banks situated at the top tiers of the pyramid. The
estimated coe¢ cients indicate that on average the bottom tier banks extend more loans
than the top tier banks by about 9.5 percentage points.
Interestingly, in all of the regressions none of the estimated coe¢ cients on the ownership
12variables, the cash ￿ ow rights and the ratio of cash ￿ ow to control rights, are statistically
signi￿cant. The results support our hypothesis that location in pyramids does matter in
explaining the variation in loan growth.
Regarding the control variables, the coe¢ cients have expected signs. We ￿nd that bank
size is negatively and signi￿cantly associated with loan growth. The results suggest that
larger banks are more reluctant to pursue riskier lending than the smaller ones. Higher
capital banks appear to have lower loan growth. We ￿nd that more pro￿table banks tend
to lend more. Lending behavior does not appear to be di⁄erent between the commercial
banks and ￿nance companies.
[Table 4 about here]
4.2.3 Pyramidal tiers and pro￿tability
In Table 5, we present the regression results of the relationship between the pyramidal tiers
and pro￿tability. Consistent with the univariate tests, we ￿nd that the estimated coe¢ cients
on the bottom tier dummy variable are negative and strongly signi￿cant in all models at the
1% level. The regression results indicate that on average the ROA of the bottom tier banks
is about 1 percentage point lower than that of the top tier peers.
Similar to the previous regression results of loan growth, the estimated coe¢ cients on
the cash ￿ ow rights and the ratio of cash ￿ ow to control rights, are statistically insigni￿cant
in all models. This suggests that there is no relationship between the ownership variables
and pro￿tability.
The estimated results on other control variables have expected signs. The results indicate
that larger banks are more pro￿table than smaller banks. We ￿nd a strong relationship
between the capital ratio and pro￿tability. On the relation between pro￿tability and loan
growth, the estimated coe¢ cients are not signi￿cant in all the OLS regressions. In the
random-e⁄ects regressions, loan growth is positively associated with pro￿tability. Finally,
we ￿nd that ￿nance companies are more pro￿table than commercial banks.
In sum, we ￿nd that banks located deeper in pyramids perform worse than banks located
13in higher tiers near the apex. The magnitude of the estimates indicate that the di⁄erence
in pro￿tability between lower and higher tier banks is economically signi￿cant. Lower tier
banks experience lower ROA of about 0.01 percentage point than top tier banks. This
di⁄erence on ROA is remarkable as it indicates the pro￿tability gap of more than 21% of
the average bottom tier banks ROA of 1.9%. Lending risky loans may be one of the reasons
why bottom tier banks perform poorly than higher tier banks. Our empirical results indicate
that banks at the bottom tiers extend about 9.5 percentage points more loans compared to
the top tier banks. This di⁄erence of 9.5 represents about 48.3% of the average bottom tier
banks loan growth of 31%, and therefore is of important economic signi￿cance. As bottom
tier banks have signi￿cantly lower pro￿tability than higher tier banks, these results suggest
that loan growth can be considered as risky investment.
Overall, our results are consistent with our hypothesis that families chose the ownership
structure to maximize the growth and stability of the group. We ￿nd that lower tier banks
take more risk and hence end up with having a poorer performance than upper tier ones.
Indeed, the fact that many bottom tier banks eventually failed after the 1997 ￿nancial crisis
is consistent with our hypothesis. We will discuss the banks￿fate in Section 5.
[Table 5 about here]
4.2.4 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our ￿ndings, we perform the following analyses.
Alternative measures of performance
To test whether our results are robust to alternative pro￿tability measures, we use ROE
in lieu of ROA. ROE is de￿ned as the ratio of the EBIT to the book value of equity. Table
6 presents the regression results. Our major ￿nding remains the same. The estimated
coe¢ cients on the bottom tier are negative and strongly signi￿cant at the 5% and 1% levels.
The coe¢ cients indicate that lower tier banks are associated with about 11 percentage points
lower ROE than top tier banks. Economically, the di⁄erence of 11 percentage points is also
very important as it is equal to about 50% more than average bottom tier banks ROE of
1418.1%. In unreported results, we repeat the analysis using the net interest margin as an
alternative measure of the bank￿ s pro￿tability. The results are qualitatively similar to our
main ￿ndings.
Endogeniety between loan growth and pro￿tability
We address potential concerns about the endogeniety of loan and pro￿tability. We em-
ploy the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation technique and estimate two equations in
which loan growth and performance are simultaneously determined (Molyneux, Remolona,
and Seth (1998) and Hanazaki, Shim, Souma, and Wiwattanakantang (2006)). To make the
equations system be identi￿ed, we add one instrumental variable in the loan growth and
pro￿tability equations. In the loan growth equation, we include the rate of loan growth in
the previous year. In the pro￿tability equation, the ratio of sta⁄ costs to total operating
expenses is included. Table 7 presents the regression results. Our ￿ndings are robust to the
estimation method. In the loan growth regression, the estimated coe¢ cients on the bottom
tier dummy are positive and statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. In the ROA and ROE
regressions, the estimated coe¢ cients on the bottom tier dummy are negative. The coe¢ -
cients are strongly signi￿cant at the 1% level in all regression models. The estimates from
the 2SLS regressions are also close in magnitude to the estimates using the OLS and the
random-e⁄ects methods. The results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests indicate that the pooled
OLS estimates are unlikely to be biased due to the endogeniety problem.
Sub-sample
To test whether our results are biased from the non-homogeneous pooling sample of
commercial banks and ￿nance companies, we run regressions of the sub-sample that includes
only ￿nance companies. Our main results remained unchanged. We ￿nd that the bottom
tier ￿nance companies are positively related to the loan growth and negatively related to
ROA and ROE. The magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cients on the bottom tier dummy is
larger than the results of all sample presented in Table 4 and Table 5.
[Table 6 and Table 7 about here]
155 Did family-owned banks prevail after the ￿nancial crisis?
In this section, we investigate what happened to the banks in each tier after the 1997
￿nancial crisis. Table 8 shows the number of banks in 2003 compared to banks in 1996. We
de￿ne that a bank is failed if it was either closed down or nationalized. We categorize the
banks based on the location in the pyramids. Interestingly, we ￿nd that the survival rate
of banks located in higher tiers is signi￿cantly higher. Statistically, about 70% of the banks
that were located in the second tier survived. In contrast to top tier banks, only about 10%
of the third tier banks did survive. The extreme cases are the fourth tier banks. None of
the three banks that were located in the fourth tier survived.
It appears that after the crisis, many business groups were dramatically restructured
(Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2006)). Anecdotal evidence shows that companies were
rearranged throughout the pyramid. For example, the Ratanarak group became more vul-
nerable as a result of the crisis, and hence undertook a major restructuring and reorganiz-
ing the organizational and ownership structure. The Ratanarak decided to remain more
focused on the ￿nancial services business which is the family￿ s original strength. There-
fore, the Ratanarak relinquished their controlling stake of the family￿ s non-core businesses
namely the Siam Cement City Pls. (SCCC), Karat Sanitaryware Plc. (KARAT), and many
other non listed companies in the construction material business. The funding from selling
the stakes of these companies was used to save the core business in the ￿nancial services
industry, in particular, the Bank of Ayudhya (BAY).
What we observe in Thailand is consistent with Morck and Nakamura (2004) who il-
lustrate the ownership of family owned zaibatsu in Japan. They argue that the ownership
structure is dynamic. They ￿nd that when the Mitsui group became shaky in 1873 and
1909, the Mitsui family reorganized the pyramid extensively by moving the ￿rms around.
Core ￿rms were placed near the apex, and non-core ￿rms were moved lower in the pyramid.
[Table 8 about here]
166 Conclusion
This paper investigates family-owned banks in Thailand. We begin our analysis by exam-
ining the ownership structure of banks and non-￿nancial ￿rms that have the same ultimate
owner. Our investigation shows that some wealthy families own an extensive empire that
includes banks and other non-￿nancial ￿rms in various industries. The mechanisms that
the families use to control the ￿rms are pyramids. We ￿nd that on average families set up a
pyramid of four tiers. A number of holding companies are placed at the apex. These holding
companies are used to control other ￿rms in the family group. About one-third of the banks
in our sample are placed in the second tier in the pyramids which are categorized as "top tier
banks". Another two-third of the banks are located in the third and fourth tiers which are
classi￿ed as "bottom tier banks". We ￿nd that bottom tier banks tend to extend more loans
and have lower performance. This ￿nding suggests that bottom tier banks undertake risky
investment. We show that these results are robust to di⁄erent measures of performance and
regression methods. Interestingly, we ￿nd that while most of the top tier banks survived
after the crisis, most of lower tier banks failed.
This evidence is consistent with the view that when the controlling family is concerned
about growth and stability of the entire group, they would choose not only what stakes to
hold in each ￿rm but also where to place the ￿rms in the group pyramid. The controlling
family can use lower tier ￿rms to undertake risky investment. This ownership setting can
insulate the entire group from the adverse e⁄ect in bad states if the investment does not
pay o⁄ because the family owns relatively low cash ￿ ow stake in lower tier ￿rms.
It would be interesting to carry out further studies to understand why families own
banks. It is puzzling because group ￿rms can share resources and hence de facto serve an
internal capital market.
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20O = Ownership (cash flow rights)
C = Control rights (voting rights)



























































































































Figure 2: The Ratanarak business group 
BBTV
100%
BAY: Ownership “O” =  21.40%, Control rights “C” = 31.60%, Ratio of ownership to control rights (“O/C”) = 0.6772






0.92%Table 1: The sample 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Commercial banks 13 33.3% 13 31.0% 13 30.2% 12 27.9% 12 25.0%
Finance companies 26 66.7% 29 69.0% 30 69.8% 31 72.1% 36 75.0%
Total sample 39 100.0% 42 100.0% 43 100.0% 43 100.0% 48 100.0%
1996 1992 1993 1994 1995
The sample includes all family-owned banks listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand during 1992-1996. 
 23Table 2: Pyramidal tiers
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Top tier banks
Tier 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Tier 2 14 35.9% 14 33.3% 14 32.6% 14 32.6% 14 29.2%
Bottom tier banks
Tier 3 23 59.0% 25 59.5% 26 60.5% 26 60.5% 31 64.6%
Tier 4 2 5.1% 3 7.1% 3 7.0% 3 7.0% 3 6.3%
Total sample 39 100.0% 42 100.0% 43 100.0% 43 100.0% 48 100.0%
1996 1992 1993 1994 1995
The table reports the distribution of the sample classified according to which tiers in the pyramid the banks
are located.   












Loan growth Mean 0.310 0.209 0.101 3.19*** 3.13***
[Median] [0.252] [0.198] [0.054]
Return on assets (ROA) Mean 0.019 0.023 -0.004 -2.92*** -3.29***
[Median] [0.019] [0.024] [-0.005]
Return on equity (ROE) Mean 0.181 0.270 -0.089 -3.46*** -4.58***
[Median] [0.167] [0.261] [-0.094]
Log (total assets) Mean 4.420 4.809 -0.389 -5.25*** -4.24***
[Median] [4.337] [4.731] [-0.394]
Book equity/total assets Mean 0.104 0.099 0.005 0.89 0.97
[Median] [0.095] [0.089] [0.006]
Total loan/total assets Mean 0.811 0.822 -0.011 -1.33 -1.58
[Median] [0.829] [0.833] [-0.004]
Cash-flow rights (O) Mean 0.203 0.233 -0.030 -1.55 -1.21
[Median] [0.189] [0.212] [-0.023]
Control rights (C)  Mean 0.271 0.289 -0.018 -1.01 -1.00
[Median] [0.257] [0.307] [-0.050]
Mean 0.714 0.757 -0.043 -1.20 -1.00
[Median] [0.781] [0.791] [-0.010]
Cash-flow rights/control rights 
(O/C)
The table reports summary statistics. Bottom tier banks are the banks that are placed at the third and fourth tiers
in the pyramid. Top tier banks are the banks that are placed at the second tier of the pyramid. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
    25Table 4: Pyramidal tiers and loan growth 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Bottom tier 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.094***
(2.75) (2.94) (2.74) (2.60) (2.69) (2.60)
Cash flow rights/100 0.115 0.113
(1.05) (0.92)
Cash flow rights/control rights 0.016 0.013
(0.23) (0.19)
Size -0.087** -0.075* -0.083* -0.083* -0.071 -0.080*
(-2.06) (-1.86) (-1.93) (-1.86) (-1.51) (-1.68)
Capital/total assets -1.434*** -1.488*** -1.454** -1.475*** -1.523*** -1.489***
(-2.71) (-2.80) (-2.58) (-2.95) (-3.02) (-2.94)
ROA 2.446* 2.389* 2.457* 2.501** 2.455** 2.508**
(1.94) (1.94) (1.94) (2.55) (2.50) (2.55)
Finance company 0.022 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.031 0.029
(0.41) (0.50) (0.44) (0.45) (0.54) (0.49)
Constant 0.605*** 0.523** 0.575** 0.589** 0.505* 0.562**
(2.67) (2.40) (2.37) (2.39) (1.92) (2.00)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 204 204 204 204 204 204
Adjusted R-squared 0.231 0.235 0.231 0.231 0.235 0.231
p-value of Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test 
0.329 0.394 0.335
OLS Random-effects
The dependent variable is loan growth. Column 1-3 show pooled OLS regression results. Column 4-6 show 
random-effects regression results. Loan growth is defined as the one-year growth rate of the total outstanding 
loan. Bottom tier equals one if the bank is located at the third and fourth tiers, and zero otherwise. Cash flow 
rights is the percentage of ownership held by the controlling family. Cash flow rights/control rights is the ratio 
of cash flow rights to control rights held by the controlling family. Size is the logarithm of total assets.
Capital/total assets is defined as total equity divided by total assets.  ROA is defined as earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets. Finance company equals one if the bank is a finance company, and 
zero otherwise. Numbers in parentheses of OLS regressions are t-statistics from heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors with clustering at the bank level. Numbers in parentheses of random-effects regressions are z-
statistics from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
 26Table 5: Pyramidal tiers and profitability (ROA)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Bottom tier -0.010*** -0.010** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(-2.72) (-2.62) (-2.73) (-3.72) (-3.52) (-3.72)
Cash flow rights  0.005 0.006
(1.09) (0.63)
Cash flow rights/control rights -0.003 -0.003
(-0.93) (-0.55)
Size 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.008** 0.009** 0.008**
(3.01) (3.02) (2.51) (2.45) (2.52) (2.08)
Capital/total assets 0.176*** 0.173*** 0.180*** 0.159*** 0.156*** 0.161***
(5.07) (4.88) (5.14) (4.49) (4.38) (4.49)
Loan growth 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.029** 0.029** 0.029**
(1.41) (1.41) (1.42) (2.42) (2.42) (2.42)
Loan growth-squared -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016
(-0.88) (-0.90) (-0.90) (-1.48) (-1.51) (-1.48)
Finance company 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014***
(2.84) (2.86) (2.62) (3.48) (3.51) (3.05)
Constant -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.047** -0.053*** -0.057*** -0.047**
(-3.31) (-3.30) (-2.61) (-2.83) (-2.87) (-2.17)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 204 204 204 204 204 204
Adjusted R-squared 0.448 0.450 0.450 0.447 0.449 0.449




The dependent variable is profitability (ROA). Column 1-3 show pooled OLS regression results. Column 4-6 
show random-effects regression results. ROA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by
total assets. Bottom tier equals one if the bank is located at the third and fourth tiers, and zero otherwise. Cash
flow rights is the percentage of ownership held by the controlling family. Cash flow rights/control rights is the 
ratio of cash flow rights to control rights held by the controlling family. Size is the logarithm of total assets.
Capital/total assets is defined as total equity divided by total assets. Loan growth is defined as the one-year 
growth rate of the total outstanding loan. Finance company equals one if the bank is a finance company, and 
zero otherwise. Numbers in parentheses of OLS regressions are t-statistics from heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors with clustering at the bank level. Numbers in parentheses of random-effects regressions are z-
statistics from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
 27Table 6: Pyramidal tiers and ROE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Bottom tier -0.104** -0.103** -0.105** -0.108*** -0.106*** -0.109***
(-2.65) (-2.61) (-2.64) (-3.64) (-3.48) -3.62
Cash flow rights  0.025 0.032
(0.58) (0.32)
Cash flow rights/control rights -0.020 -0.018
(-0.70) (-0.32)
Size 0.091*** 0.094*** 0.086*** 0.092** 0.095** 0.087**
(3.85) (3.83) (3.49) (2.49) (2.46) (2.20)
Capital/total assets -0.148 -0.163 -0.123 -0.317 -0.338 -0.308
(-0.67) (-0.74) (-0.55) (-0.83) (-0.87) (-0.79)
Loan growth 0.341 0.341 0.342 0.349*** 0.350*** 0.349***
(1.49) (1.49) (1.50) (2.70) (2.69) (2.69)
Loan growth-squared -0.198 -0.197 -0.198 -0.210* -0.212* -0.211*
(-1.04) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.82) (-1.83) (-1.82)
Finance company 0.139** 0.141** 0.133** 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.145***
(2.61) (2.61) (2.55) (3.38) (3.37) (3.04)
Constant -0.399*** -0.416*** -0.359** -0.390* -0.412* -0.353
(-2.74) (-2.71) (-2.32) (-1.93) (-1.91) (-1.51)
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 204 204 204 204 204 204
Adjusted R-squared 0.340 0.340 0.341 0.339 0.340 0.340




The dependent variable is ROE. Column 1-3 show pooled OLS regression results. Column 4-6 show random-
effects regression results. ROE is defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total equity.
Bottom tier equals one if the bank is located at the third and fourth tiers, and zero otherwise. Cash flow rights is 
the percentage of ownership held by the controlling family. Cash flow rights/control rights is the ratio of cash 
flow rights to control rights held by the controlling family. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Capital/total 
assets is defined as total equity divided by total assets. Loan growth is defined as the one-year growth rate of the 
total outstanding loan. Finance company equals one if the bank is a finance company, and zero otherwise. 
Numbers in parentheses of OLS regressions are t-statistics from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with 
clustering at the bank level. Numbers in parentheses of random-effects regressions are z-statistics from 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 28Table 7: Two stage least squares (2SLS) regression
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Bottom tier 0.085** 0.089** 0.087** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.085***
(1.97) (2.09) (1.98) (-3.06) (-2.96) (-3.08) (-3.10) (-3.03) (-3.09)
Cash flow rights  0.176 0.003 0.013
(1.57) (0.32) (0.13)
Cash flow rights/control rights 0.040 -0.003 -0.011
(0.60) (-0.60) (-0.19)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204
Adjusted R-squared 0.210 0.225 0.205 0.451 0.448 0.449 0.320 0.317 0.317
p-value of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.514 0.587 0.501 0.842 0.854 0.847 0.888 0.893 0.889
ROA ROE
Profitability Loan growth
The table reports two stage least squares regression results. The dependent variable is loan growth in Column 1-3, ROA in Column 4-6, and ROE in Column 7-
9, respectively. Loan growth is defined as the one-year growth rate of the total outstanding loan. ROA is defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)
divided by total assets. ROE is defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total equity. Bottom tier equals one if the bank is located at the
third and fourth tiers, and zero otherwise. Cash flow rights is the percentage of ownership held by the controlling family. Cash flow rights/control rights is the
ratio of cash flow rights to control rights held by the controlling family. Other control variables are defined in Table 4-6. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 29Table 8: Family-owned banks after the financial crisis
No. % No. %
Top tier banks
   Tier 1 0 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
   Tier 2 14 10 71.4% 4 28.6%
Bottom tier banks
   Tier 3 31 3 9.7% 28 90.3%
   Tier 4 3 0 0.0% 3 100.0%
Total sample  48 13 27.1% 35 72.9%
Failure
Post-crisis (as of 2003) Pre-crisis 
(as of 1996)
Survival
The table shows the number of family-owned banks before and after the 1997 financial crisis.
Pre-crisis is as of 1996. Post-crisis is as of 2003. A bank is defined as failure if it was either
closed down or nationalized. 
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